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ABSTRACT
Embodied conversational agents become more and more re-
alistic concerning their conversational and their nonverbal
behaviors. But if the information conveyed nonverbally ex-
hibits clues that are not consistent with the verbal part of
an agent’s action, how will the user react to such a discrep-
ancy? Masking ones real emotions with a smile is a naturally
occuring example of such a discrepancy. But such masks are
often deficient and thus subtle clues of lying and deceiving
manifest themselves in facial expressions. The questions is
how users will react to these clues if they are conveyed by
an agent. Will they render an application unattractive or on
the contrary more human-like? In this paper, we examine
such facial clues to deception and present the results of two
empirical studies: i.) lies in monologues by a talking head
presenting movies, ii.) lies in an interactive game of dice.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.1 [Multimedia Information Systems]: Artificial, aug-
mented, and virtual realities; Evaluation/methodology; H.5.2
[User Interfaces]: Evaluation/methodology
General Terms
Design, Human Factors
Keywords
Embodied Conversational Agents, Non-verbal Behavior, En-
gagement, Deception
1. INTRODUCTION
In human-human communication, emotions are the number-
one topic that people lie about, and studies show that up
to 30% of social interactions longer than 10 minutes con-
tain such deceptions [8]. Usually, social lies are employed to
protect the face of others or the relationship to others. A
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typical example are excuses, such as ”I would love to join
you, but ...”. Even though a significant amount of work
has been devoted to the development of synthetic agents
that emulate aspects of social interactions between humans,
the simulation of social lies and deception are nearly non-
existing topics.
McKenzie and colleagues [17] discuss the potential ben-
efits of deceptive agents as training partners that help the
user to recognize malicious intent, but do not present any
implementation. Castelfranchi and Poggi [5] developed a
theory of deception in communication which has grounded
prototyping of a deception modeling tool in which both the
deceiver and the receiver of the message are modeled [3, 6].
The issue of deception has also been addressed in the area
of conversational systems [15] and in the area of multi-agent
systems where different strategies of deception and their ef-
fects on the interaction of agents are explored [4, 28].
Besides work on cognitive models for deceptive agents,
various attempts have been made to create synthetic agents
that deliberately oppress or express a certain emotion. Pela-
chaud and colleagues [7] as well as Prendinger and colleagues
[21] developed agents that are able to control their emotional
displays if the social situation requires it. For instance, if
the social distance between an agent and its conversational
partner is high, Prendinger’s agent would not show anger to
the full extent. The virtual tutor COSMO [16] intentionally
portrays emotions with the goal of motivating students and
thus increasing the learning effect.
All these approaches start from the assumption that the
agent is able to perfectly hide emotions if the social or ped-
agogical situation requires it. However, humans are not al-
ways capable of completely concealing their true emotions.
For instance, masking smiles cannot entirely override the
muscular program of the original emotion because not every
facial muscle can be consciously controlled. As a conse-
quence, such a mask will always include segments of one’s
felt emotion. The question arises of how to handle situations
in which the agent decides to display an emotion which is
in conflict with its internal appraisal processes. In some
situations, it might be desirable to employ agents that per-
fectly convey ”wrong” emotions with the aim to convince
the interlocutor. Consider a sales agent on the web that
has to advertise a product of minor quality. If it does not
succeed in concealing its negative attitude towards the prod-
uct, a decrease of the sales might be the consequence. On
the other hand, agents in social settings may come across
as little believable or cold if they are always able to per-
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fectly hide their true emotions. In addition, the display of
mixed emotions may even lead to a positive response from
the interlocutor. For instance, students may feel sympathy
towards a virtual teacher that desperately tries to hide its
negative emotions caused by the students’ bad performance.
Last but not least, the emulation of deceptive behaviors may
enrich our interactions with synthetic agents - especially in
game-like environments.
In this paper, we will focus on synthetic agents that may
express emotions that are in conflict with their appraisal
processes. Unlike earlier work, we will model situations in
which the agent fails to entirely conceal its “felt” emotions.
We will also investigate the influence of such a behavior on
the relationship between agent and user.
Earlier studies examine whether or not the presence of a
synthetic agent contributes to the building of trust and how
this process may be supported by the agent’s conversational
behaviors [26, 19, 1]. None of these works focuses, however,
on the impact of subtle emotional expressions on the users
attitude towards the agent. In this paper, we will present
the results of two experiments we conducted in order to find
out whether users notice a difference between agents that
fake emotions perfectly and agents that reveal their “true”
emotions by deceptive clues. Furthermore, we will inves-
tigate whether humans are able to correctly interpret such
subtle clues of deception. For instance, it might be the case
that users notice the agent’s deceptive behaviours, but at-
tribute them to a bad design of the agent or a malfunction
of the system. Thirdly, we will analyze in how far the con-
versational setting influences the user’s sensitivity towards
deceptive clues. In particular, we will compare monologues
in which the user just observes the agent with multi-player
game scenarios in which the user actively interacts with the
agent and other users.
2. A FIRST MODEL
The objective of our work is to develop an agent whose
behaviors may reflect potential conflicts between “felt” and
deliberately expressed emotions. As a first step, we con-
centrate on facial expressions of deception which have been
profoundly researched in the psychological literature. Ac-
cording to Ekman [9], there are at least four ways in which
facial expressions may vary if they accompany lies and de-
ceptions: micro-expressions, masks, timing, and asymmetry.
1. Micro-expressions: A false emotion is displayed, but
the felt emotion is unconsciously expressed for the frac-
tion of a second. The detection of such micro-expressions
is possible for a trained observer.
2. Masks: The felt emotion (e.g., disgust) is masked by
a non- corresponding facial expression, in general by
a smile. Because we are not able to control all of our
facial muscles, such a masking smile is in some way
deficient. Thus, it reveals at least in part the original
emotion.
3. Timing: Facial expressions accompanying true emo-
tions do not last for a very long time. Thus, the longer
an expression lasts the more likely it is that it is ac-
companying a lie. A special case seems to be surprise,
where elongated on- and offset times are a good indi-
cator of a false emotion.
4. Asymmetry: Voluntarily created facial expressions like
they occur during lying and deceiving tend to be dis-
played in an asymmetrical way, i.e., there is more ac-
tivity on one side of the face than on the other.
To model the non-verbal behavior, we employ the Greta1
agent system developed by Catherine Pelachaud and col-
leagues [20, 13]. This agent is compliant with the MPEG-
4 standard which allows to control the facial expressions
and body gestures by so-called facial animation parameters
(FAPs) and body animation parameters (BAPs). Due to
technical reasons, we had to limit our evaluations to masks
and asymmetry. A more recent version of the Greta agent
also enables the specification of micro-expressions and exact
timing of expressions, and we will extend our model by these
features in the near future.
Since it was not possible to get the original video ma-
terial from Ekman due to legal reasons, we reconstructed
the animations for the deceiving condition out of pictures
from the original studies and based on textual descriptions
of the facial clues found in [9], [10], and [11]. We concen-
trated on masking smiles for disgust, sadness, anger, and
fear. Different masks are deficient in several aspects. For
instance, we considered masks where the eyebrows are still
frowning in anger, but the mouth displays a normal smile as
well as masks where the frown is not very articulated and
there is only a small smile. Different degrees of masking are
combined with different degrees of asymmetry of the facial
displays resulting in 32 possible facial expressions.
3. LIES IN MONOLOGUES
The objective of the first experiment was to measure the
impact of deceptive clues on the user’s subjective impres-
sion of the agent. On the basis of related studies, we ex-
pected more negative ratings for the deceptive than for the
non-deceptive agent. Studies by Swerts and colleagues [25]
indicate that humans are to a certain extent able to distin-
guish speakers with low confidence from speakers with high
confidence based on audio-visual cues. We assumed that we
would obtain similar results for presentations with a talk-
ing head. Nass and colleagues [19] observed that subjects
perceive inconsistent agents less positively than consistent
agents. Since our deceptive agents have to handle potential
conflicts between felt emotions and emotions to be conveyed,
they may end up with behaviors that appear as inconsistent
and thus cause a similar effect as the inconsistent agents in
the experiment by Nass and colleagues.
To explore this hypothesis, we devised an experimental
setting in which different versions of the Greta agent pre-
sented movie reviews to the users. The comments of the
agents were always positive implying that the agents liked
the movies. As independent variable, we defined the absence
(N) or presence of deceptive clues (L) which was manipu-
lated within subjects. In condition N, the facial expressions
corresponded to the positive comments. In condition L, fa-
cial clues indicated that the agent might have a different
opinion on the movies than it actually verbalized.
In order to control for assumptions concerning preferred
movie genres for Greta, a pretest was done with 10 stu-
dents and two of our colleagues. The subjects were shown a
1We are grateful to Catherine Pelachaud, Maurizio Mancini,
and Björn Hartmann for supporting our work with the Greta
Agent.
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Figure 1: A natural vs. a disgust-lie smile
small presentation by Greta about the local weather over the
last two weeks. This topic was chosen due to its small talk
character [1]. Afterwards, subjects had to indicate which
out of ten different movie genres Greta might prefer. There
was no clearly identifiable genre the subjects associated with
Greta’s preferences. For our first evaluation, we decided to
restrict ourselves to five out of the ten genres: horror, ad-
venture, animation, comedy, and action.
Two movies were chosen for each genre that were at least
among the top five box office hits in Germany to ensure an
even distribution of knowledge about the single movies. Af-
ter that, two versions for the presentation of each movie by
the Greta agent were produced. In condition (N), only facial
expressions from the original Greta library were employed.
In condition (L), the utterances were accompanied by ex-
pressions we modeled to realize masking smiles (see Section
2). For example, in condition (N), the agent would say “I
really enjoyed the happy end” accompanied by a true smile,
i.e. express the emotion joy. In condition (L), the same ut-
terance would be accompanied by a facial expression that
masks disgust by a smile. Thus, the ”true” emotion (dis-
gust) leaks out in the facial expression of the agent. Figure
1 shows an example. Some features of disgust are present
in the disgust-lie smile. The upper lip is raised, the eyelids
are closed to a certain degree and the eyebrows moved in-
ward and down. These features are less articulated than in
real disgust, and they are blended with the natural smile.
Moreover, there is asymmetry in the smile with more smil-
ing action on the right side of the face. From the possible
32 facial expressions we created (see Section 2), only 7 were
used frequently (2-8 times) during the presentations to con-
trol the relevant features more firmly. For both conditions,
(neutral) synthetic speech was used.
In order to enable unique references to the single agents
in the questionnaire, the different versions were represented
by different hair colors: a blond and a brunette agent. To
prevent unwanted biases by the hair color of the agents, two
groups of students were tested. The first group consisted of
11 students. In this group, the brunette agent represented
the non-deceiving (N), the blond one the deceiving condi-
tion (L). The second group consisted of 18 students. Here,
the deceiving condition was represented by the brunette, the
non-deceiving condition by the blond agent. At the begin-
ning of the experiment, the subjects were given an introduc-
tion by both agents to get acquainted with the mimics and
the synthesized voice of the agents.
After that, ten movies were presented in a row where the
Characteristic features Agent Result
Reliable L 0.07
N 0.29
Trustworthy L 0.14
N 0.32
Convincing L 0.18
N 0.39
Credible L 0.14
N 0.43
Certain L 0.11
N 0.32
Table 1: Results of the questionnaire
order in which the agents appeared was varied. Both agents
presented one movie from each of the five genres. Subjects
were told that we were interested in testing different syn-
chronization methods for speech and facial displays and re-
quested to pay special attention to the agents’ mimics. In
order to make sure that the subjects listened to the agents’
reviews carefully, they were furthermore told that we wanted
to investigate the effect of the different animation methods
on memory and that they would be asked questions concern-
ing the content of the presentations afterwards.
After the presentations, the subjects had to answer a
questionnaire about the content of the presentation and the
quality of the animations (synchronization of media, appro-
priateness of mimics and voice quality). The questionnaire
also contained questions about characteristic features of the
agents (trustworthy, convincing, sympathetic, credible, cer-
tain, dependable, reliable, competent, professionally com-
petent). The subjects were asked to indicate for which of
the agents a certain feature fits better (blond or brunette
aka deceiving/non-deceiving). They could also mark a ”no
difference between agents”-box. In case they preferred one
of the agents they had the option of giving reasons for this
preference. If the subjects preferred an agent at all in re-
spect to the tested features, they named the non-deceiving
agent. The results for the crucial characteristic features are
given in Table 1. Due to the high number of subjects with
no preference, the results are only weakly significant, i.e., at
a confidence level of p < 0.1.
Obviously, the non-deceiving agent is perceived as being
more reliable, trustable, convincing, credible, and more cer-
tain about what it said. We interpret this finding as evidence
that the subjects were effected by the facial clues of deceit
shown by the deceptive agent in condition (L), other things
being equal. The deceptive agent’s ”real” emotions about
the movies leak through her facial expressions and make
the propositional content of the agent’s utterances, i.e., the
praise of the presented movie, appear less likely. We did
not observe any significant differences in the quality ratings
of the animations for the two agent versions. Furthermore,
the subjects could not name the reasons for their uneasiness
with the deceptive agent.
The question arises of why we did not observe a much
higher preference for the non-deceptive agent in terms of
percentages. These results are in line with findings on facial
clues to deception [9]. Because such clues are only subtle,
some training is required to recognize them for certain dur-
ing an interaction. Thus, it could not be expected that the
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subjects would definitely detect the relevant features espe-
cially since they did not have any information on the true
purpose of the experiment. Furthermore, as Krahmer and
colleagues [14] notice inconsistencies between nonverbal cues
might be less offensive than inconsistencies between verbal
and nonverbal cues. We would also like to emphasize that we
focused deliberately on the simulation of subtle signals of de-
ception even though a synthetic character like Greta would
of course also allow for more extreme facial expressions. Fi-
nally, our clues of deception were restricted to asymmetry
and masking so far.
4. LIES IN INTERACTIVE GAME SCENAR-
IOS
The first experiment has shown that subjects obviously
rate an agent more negatively if it uses deceptive clues. The
question arises, however, of whether the user would be able
to correctly identify the cases in which the agent was telling
the truth and in which cases it was lying. Secondly, we were
wondering whether a deceptive agent would also be rated
more negatively than a sincere agent in a situation in which
lies are socially desirable.
To shed light on this question, we devised an interactive
scenario called GAMBLE where two users play a simple
game of dice (also known as Mexicali) with the agent. To
win the game it is indispensable to lie to the other play-
ers and to catch them lying to you. The traditional (not
computer-based) version of the game is played with two dice
that are shaken in a cup. Let’s assume player 1 casts the
dice. He inspects the dice without permitting the other play-
ers to have a look. The cast is interpreted in the following
way: the higher digit always represents the first part of the
cast. Thus, a 5 and a 2 correspond to a 52. Two equal
digits (11, ..., 66) have a higher value than the other casts,
the highest cast is a 21. Player 1 has to announce his cast
with the constraint that he has to say a higher number than
the previous player. For instance, if he casts a 52, but the
previous player already announced a 61, player 1 has to say
at least 62. Now player 2 has to decide whether to believe
the other player’s claim. In this case, he has to cast next.
Otherwise, the dice are shown and if player 1 has lied he has
lost this round and has to start a new one. For the experi-
ment, each player was equipped with a PDA which replaced
the cup with the cubes in the original game.
As in the first evaluation, two conditions were tested: (i)
an agent that does not show clues to deception in its facial
expressions (N) and (ii) an agent that does exhibit these
clues (L). The same facial expressions as before were used.
One frequent comment in the first evaluation was the bad
voice quality of the agent. To make the game more en-
tertaining, we dubbed the animations with a real human
voice. Moreover, a full body agent was used and a num-
ber of emblematic german gestures were modelled relying
on the descriptions in the Berlin dictionary of everyday ges-
tures (”Berliner Lexikon der Alltagsgesten”, [2]).
In order to make sure that the users paid sufficient at-
tention to the agent’s behaviour (and did not just concen-
trate on the PDA display or the other user), they were told
that the agent might not be able to conceal her emotions
perfectly, but left it open how deceptive behaviours might
be detected. Consequently, the subjects had no idea which
channel of expression to concentrate on. To incite the sub-
Figure 2: The setting
Features Condition Result
1. Caught L 0.72
N 0.73
2. Falsely accused L 0.54
N 0.54
Table 2: Results of the GAMBLE evaluation
jects to find out whether the agent was lying or not, they
were promised a reward of 5 Euro in case they won against
the agent.
In this study, 24 students from computer science and com-
munication studies participated. They were divided into 12
teams from which 6 teams were randomly assigned to the
L-, the other 6 to the N-condition. Each team played two
rounds of 12 minutes, participants changed position after
the first round. Thus, each participant came to play after
the agent and had to judge the agent’s announcements (see
Fig. 2). We videotaped the interactions and we logged the
game progress for the analysis.
The log-files were used to calculate how often the agent
was caught lying and how often it was falsely accused by the
human players. Table 2 gives the results of this calculation.
There was nearly no difference between the two conditions.
The agent was caught in 72% of the cases in the L- and in
73% in the N-condition. It was falsely accused of lying 54%
in the L- as well as in the N-condition. Furthermore, there
were no significant differences in the user’s subjective rating
of the two agent versions. We did not expect the users to
negatively rate the agents’ deceptive behaviors in particu-
lar. After all, deceptive behaviors are a major element of the
game. Nevertheless, we considered the possibility that the
deceptive agent would get a less positive rating due to the
inconsistencies in its behaviors as in the first experiment.
However, the experiment led to clear and non-ambiguous
results that were not expected in this clarity from the pre-
vious evaluation. Obviously the clues of deception that the
agent exhibits in the L-condition are either disregarded, not
interpreted or unintelligible and have no effect at all on the
overall game progress. In the following, we will discuss sev-
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look at overall acc.
yes 111 60
no 62 30
yes/no 14 4
no/yes 15 6
Table 3: Looking behavior of human players
eral reasons why we might have got different results in the
first and the second evaluation.
Reason 1: Users decide without looking at the agent.
In some demo runs we discovered that users tended to look
at their PDAs instead of at the agent. To remedy this, the
information displayed on the PDA was reduced to a mini-
mum. Especially the announcements of the players are no
longer displayed on the PDA making it necessary to attend
to the other players and the agent. But perhaps users still
continued deciding if the agent was lying without looking at
the agent at all. To verify this hypothesis, we analysed the
videotapes for the L-condition as to whether people looked
at the agent during the agent’s announcement of its casts.
Table 3 provides the results. Leaving the cases aside in
which subjects first looked at the agent and then away or
vice versa, the agent was looked at in two thirds of the cases
and only disregarded in one third of the cases. We also
counted the number of times that the agent was accused
(acc.) by the subjects giving us the same numbers, i.e., in
two thirds of the cases the agent was looked at, in one third
it was disregarded. Thus, users tend to look at the agent
during its announcements and they tend to look at the agent
before accusing it of a false announcement. Consequently,
this hypothesis does not explain the outcome of our experi-
ment.
Reason 2: Users decide based on voice quality.In our
first evaluation, subjects gave us the feedback that the syn-
thesized voice is hard to understand, sounds boring and does
not go very well with the presentation of the movies. To
make the interaction more natural and to enhance the en-
tertaining factor of the GAMBLE system, we decided to dub
the animations of the Greta agent with a human voice this
time. Concerning the ease of interaction, this choice was a
success because only one subject mentioned the voice qual-
ity as a problem in the GAMBLE system. Different to our
first evaluation, the signals coming from the audio channel
were more natural now than the signals coming from the
visual channel which might have induced the subjects to
over-interpret the agents’ voice. During the game subjects
occasionally commented on the voice quality by saying e.g.,
“That sounded like a lie.”2 or “Now she sounded shy.”3
and decided accordingly if the agent was lying or not. Thus,
it might well be the case that people heavily relied on the
verbal channel of communication for detecting deceptive be-
haviors. Unfortunately, we have only scarce evidence for this
effect because users did not frequently spontaneously explain
the rationale behind their decisions during the game.
2Das klingt wie eine Lüge
3Jetzt hörte sie sich aber schüchtern an
Reason 3: Users decide based on what is said.To make
the interaction in GAMBLE as natural as possible, a sample
corpus of interactions between human players was utilised
to create the agent’s comments and announcements. Four
types of agent actions were realized in this first version of
GAMBLE: (i) reactions to the announcement of the previ-
ous player, such as “Are you crazy?”4, (ii) reactions to the
agent’s own cast, such as “What shall I do now?”5, (iii)
announcements of the cast, such as “I have 62”, and (iv)
reactions to having won or lost, such as “You have lost”. Of
these types only (iii) is interesting for our analysis. In the
corpus of the real players, announcements were found, such
as “I have 24, sorry 42” or “I have 62, ehh 63”. The first
one is attributable to a misreading of the cast because in
GAMBLE, the higher digit always comes first, thus a 2 and
a 4 is always a 42. The second one is more crucial. Here,
the repaired speech is likely to make the next player feel in-
secure as to whether this was just a slip of the tongue or an
indication that the announcement is false. We made the ob-
servation that users usually interpreted speech repairs and
hesitations as a sign of lying which was also reflected by their
comments during the game. Subjects occasionally indicated
their disbelief and irritation, but also their surprise that the
agent was so cunning. This effect occurred of course in both
conditions. Nevertheless, the rich verbal channel might have
caused the subjects to more or less ignore the visual channel.
Reason 4: Users decide on objective criteria like prob-
ability of casts.It is very unlikely that a player lies about a
low cast like 32 if it is sufficient for him. On the other hand,
announcing a 55 makes it very likely that this is a lie because
the probability to score 55 or above is 1
9
which is roughly
11%. Table 4 gives the probabilities for the possible casts.
Usually, it makes sense to start from the assumption that
the probability to lie increases equally with the decrease in
the probability of the cast. There are exceptions from this
rule with experienced liars or at the beginning of a game
where it is unlikely that a player starts with a lie. Taking
the need to lie into account, the log-files were re-examined
according to how often the agent was caught lying or was
falsely accused of lying in regard to the probability of its
announced cast. Table 5 presents the results. In the case of
casts with a probability above 50% (31-54) there was no dif-
ference at all (1a, 0% vs. 0%). In fact, the agent very rarely
lied and was not caught at all in either condition. In case of
the casts above 50% (62-21) a slight tendency towards the
L-condition can be seen (1b, 84% vs. 77%). Assuming that
in the case of casts below 22% people tend to just disbelief
their previous player, we looked into the differences between
the L- and N-condition in the range of 44% to 22% (1c, 62-
65). In this case, subjects in the L-condition were better
lie catchers (70% vs. 53%). Next, we analysed how often
users falsely accused the agent of lying, i.e., how often they
didn’t believe the agent’s claim even though the agent told
the truth. The results for this analysis (2a-c) are comparable
and consistent with the analysis on how often the accusation
was right. Looking into the cases where the probability is
above (2a, 100% vs. 100%) or below 50% (2b, 51% vs. 50%),
there is no difference at all. As mentioned above, the agent
very rarely lied in the case of casts with a probability above
4Du spinnst wohl?
5Was mach ich jetzt nur
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Thr. Prob. Thr. Prob. Thr. Prob.
31 1 =100% 53 . 11 4/18=22%
32 17/18 54 . 22 3.5/18
41 . 61 9/18=50% 33 3/18
42 . 62 8/18=44% 44 .
43 . 63 . 55 .
51 . 64 . 66 .
52 12/18 65 . 21 1/18
Table 4: Probabilities of the possible casts
Features Condition Result
1. a.) Caught (>50%) L 0.0
N 0.0
b.) Caught (<50%) L 0.84
N 0.77
c.) Caught (>22%, <50%) L 0.7
N 0.53
2. a.) Falsely accused (>50%) L 1.0
N 1.0
b.) Falsely accused (<50%) L 0.51
N 0.5
c.) Falsely accused L 0.52
(>22%, <50%) N 0.69
Table 5: Results regarding probability of cast
50%, thus an accusation in this case is likely to be wrong
and indeed all accusations in this value range are wrong re-
gardless of the condition. Last we looked into the area we
identified above as crucial, i.e., where the probability of the
cast is between 44% and 22%. Again, a difference was found
in this case. The agent is less often falsely accused in the
L-condition (2c, 52% vs 69%). Although the differences are
well explained by the game’s logic, they are not statistically
significant which is mostly attributable to the small number
of lies encountered. In the L-condition, the agent lied 22
times, in the N-condition 19 times, i.e, 1.8 times per subject
in the L-, 1.6 times in the N-condition. Given that subjects
really decided rationally according to the probability of the
casts, meaning that only in the crucial area below 50% they
were interested in other features than this objective one,
they had not much opportunity to learn how to interpret
the agent’s facial expressions. To verify this hypothesis a
long-time study would be necessary, giving the participants
the opportunity to get acquainted with the behavior of the
agent more thoroughly.
Reason 5: Users are too engaged in the interaction
to pay much attention to facial expressions.There is
one big difference between the first and the second eval-
uation study. In the first evaluation, the subjects had to
watch and listen to presentations given by the agents pas-
sively without any kind of interaction or disturbance. They
could devote their full concentration to the agents and their
verbal and non-verbal behaviors. In the GAMBLE setting,
the subjects become an active part interacting with another
human player and with the agent. Thus, the subjects’ at-
tention cannot be fully directed towards the agent. Instead,
they have to evaluate the announcements made by the other
players, they have to think about their next move based on
this evaluation, and they have to operate the PDA interface
which is simple, but nevertheless new to them. Standing
face to face to the agent instead of just observing the head
projected to the classroom wall leaves the subjects with a
smaller facial display to interpret. Although we tried to
compensate for this by zooming towards the agent when it
announces its cast (see Fig. 2), the resulting size of the
head does not nearly match the size in the face-only condi-
tion. The setting itself is more immersive because instead of
seeing the agent’s head projected to the wall while sitting in
the classroom, the agent shares the interaction space with
the human players (see Fig. 2). The full body agent is pro-
jected on the wall between the two human players thus cre-
ating a triangular face-to-face arrangement. Consequently,
subjects are more involved into the interaction which leaves
less capacity to concentrate on observing the agent’s behav-
ior. This immersion of the human players manifests itself
on different levels: (i) The subjects reacted directly to the
agent and its comments. If the agent e.g., said “I wanna see
that!”6 it happened that subjects showed their PDA to the
agent or said something like “Yeah just take a look”7. (ii)
When examining the subjects attentive behaviors, we ob-
served that the subjects frequently looked at the agent (see
above). According to Sidner and colleagues [24], this be-
havior may be interpreted as a sign of engagement with the
interaction partner. The more often users look at the agent
the more engaged they seem to be in the interaction. Up
to now, we have analyzed the looking behaviors of the users
during the agent’s announcements. (iii) At the end of the
experiment every subject had to fill in a short questionnaire
to rate the interaction experience. Out of the 24 subjects
nearly everybody thought it was enjoyable (24), funny (22),
and interesting (23). Nobody rated it as boring, but only
seven subjects found it amazing. A number of subjects also
said it was drab (9) or monotonous (10). This seems to con-
trast with the overall rating of funny and enjoyable, but can
be explained when looking at the comments provided by the
participants. The small amount of utterances and their rep-
etition were the most frequents comments (12) on drawbacks
of the system which makes the agent appear a little bit drab
or monotonous. Because the animations were dubbed be-
forehand, there was only a limited number of them available
at runtime leading to repetitions during longer interactions.
Being more engaged in the interaction and thus having
less capacity to interpret the facial expressions of the agent
corresponds to Ekman’s findings that people tend to disre-
gard such facial clues to deceit in everyday life [9]. Ekman
and colleagues [11] observed that subjects were generally
not better than chance distinguishing honest from deceptive
faces. Those that did better than chance pointed to facial
clues as their decision aid. Thus, despite their visibility
those clues were often not used.
5. CURRENT AND FUTURE WORK
The GAMBLE system was presented as a testbed to inves-
tigate the effects that deceiving ECAs have on the human-
ECA interaction. Apart from user reactions to deceiving
ECAs, GAMBLE also allows us to study the following as-
pects of human-agent interactions:
• Affective interactions: Prendinger et al. [22] have
6Das will ich sehn!
7Na dann schau mal
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Figure 3: Improving the setting
shown how the display of emotional cues in an agent
influences the user’s appraisal of a situation. In GAM-
BLE, highly emotional situations are created, e.g. when
the agent blames the user for deceit or when the user
detects such an attempt and the agent has to react to
it. Measuring the user’s affective states by means of
physiological sensors, we will investigate how different
expressive behaviors of the agent exert an influence on
these states.
• Engagement in multiparty interactions: According to
Reeves and Nass [23] users tend to regard their social
rules even in interacting with computers. And indeed,
a number of studies of face to face interaction between
an user and an ECA have confirmed that this tendency
exists (e.g., [18]). Less is known about the effects that
arise if multiple users interact with a single agent. In
GAMBLE, the user’s attention is divided between an-
other human player and the agent. Thus, engaging
the user in the interaction with the agent becomes less
predictable.
The first evaluation which we presented in this article
showed on the one hand that users were drawn into the
game and engaged in the interaction with the agent. On the
other hand, the comments in the questionnaires indicated
some shortcomings of the system.
Although the setting was engaging to the users, standing
in front of the wall to which the agent is projected felt a
little bit awkward to the subjects. Now, the players sit at a
table, the agent is projected to the wall at the head of the
table, creating a much more natural atmosphere for such a
game of dice (s. Fig. 3). The dubbed voice rendered the
agent more engaging but had two crucial drawbacks. (i) As
mentioned above, subjects seemed to pay too much atten-
tion to the voice quality, and (ii) the number of the agent’s
announcements was limited. At the moment, we are experi-
menting with different speech synthesizers which will make a
context and situation dependent generation of dialogue acts
possible. A thorough analysis of the users looking behavior
over the whole time of the interaction revealed a conspicuous
interest in the handheld devices that served as interfaces to
the system. The gaze of the users was attracted by the PDA
over 50% of the time. To get rid of the PDAs, a haptic inter-
face was developed: the camcup which is a camera-mounted
cup of dice that allows the users to just cast the dice in a
natural way. The camera image enables the game server to
keep track of the game process. The players announcements,
i.e., result and belief statements, are captured by a speaker
independent speech recognition system [12].
Little is know about the interaction dynamics, if an agent
is confronted with more than one user. The video material
collected during the first evaluation study is now employed
to inform the design of a model of gaze behavior in such a
multiparty scenario because apart from a study by Vertegaal
et al. [27] no information is available on multiparty gaze
behaviors. With an active gaze behavior of the agent, it will
e.g. become possible to investigate gaze as another clue to
deception in an agent.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an approach to the expression
of emotions which considers the conflict between emotions
an agent actually feels and emotions that it wishes to con-
vey deliberately. Unlike earlier work, we did not start from
the assumption that the agent is always able to conceal its
“true” emotions perfectly, but simulated the occurrence of
deceptive clues based on Ekman’s studies of human facial
displays. In addition, we presented two experiments we con-
ducted in order to find out how deceptive clues are subjec-
tively perceived by a human user and to what extent users
are able to correctly interpret them.
Our first study indicates that even subtle expressions of
deception may have an unfavorable impact on the user’s
perception of the agent - especially in situations where the
user is expected to devote her full attention to the agent.
Although people reacted to facial clues of deceit when they
had the opportunity to carefully watch and compare dif-
ferent instances of agents, they were not able to name the
reasons for these reactions (see Sec. 3). A designer of an
interface agent should take such effects into account in order
to prevent that unintended clues are conveyed by accident.
The results of the first study could, however, not be con-
firmed for the second scenario in which the experimental
conditions were much less controlled. We have discussed a
number of reasons why the users might have responded dif-
ferently in the second experiment, such as the probability of
the lies, the overestimation of other channels of expression
and the distraction of the players by the game. In a more
natural and engaging face-to-face situation, subjects tend to
disregard deceptive clues which seems to be a natural phe-
nomenon. Even in a domain where it is crucial to catch
the other interaction partners lying, other communication
features seem to be more important in the decision making
process.
The second experiment also showed that it is hard to iden-
tify the clues users actually rely on. Clearly, we could have
requested the user beforehand to pay special attention to the
face as in the first experiment. The purpose of this exper-
iment was, however, to investigate the impact of deceptive
clues in a natural scenario in which the user may freely inter-
act without being forced to concentrate on a specific channel
(which would have also affected the entertaining value of the
game). Obviously, people’s expectations about an agent’s
abilities heavily influences their interpretation of the agent’s
behavior. The second experiment indicates that people tend
to over interpret signals coming from the most sophisticated
channel (even if they are obviously hard coded).
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